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Abstract
The ever-increasing amount of major security incidents has led to an emerging interest in cooperative
approaches to encounter cyber threats. To enable cooperation in detecting and preventing attacks it is an
inevitable necessity to have structured and standardized formats to describe an incident. Corresponding
formats are complex and of an extensive nature as they are often designed for automated processing and
exchange. These characteristics hamper the readability and, therefore, prevent humans from understanding
the documented incident. This is a major problem since the success and effectiveness of any security
measure rely heavily on the contribution of security experts.
To meet these shortcomings we propose a visual analytics concept enabling security experts to analyze and
enrich semi-structured cyber threat intelligence information. Our approach combines an innovative way of
persisting this data with an interactive visualization component to analyze and edit the threat information. We
demonstrate the feasibility of our concept using the Structured Threat Information eXpression, the state-of-
the-art format for reporting cyber security issues.
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Introduction
Over the last years the number of IT security inci-
dents has been constantly increasing among compan-
ies. In order to keep pace with this development,
there is a necessity for ever-improving protective
measures. As single entities are no longer able to
handle the vast amount of possible attack scenarios
acting collaboratively against such attacks is an emer-
ging trend. It is widely believed that cooperative
approaches, in particular those based on the exchange
of threat intelligence information, can contribute signifi-
cantly to improve defensive capabilities (Shackleford
2015). A key factor for realizing cooperative approaches
are the underlying threat intelligence data formats. They
offer a semi-structured representation of identified threats
and ensure a common understanding of security-related
observations. As they document incidents using general
mark-up languages, a common characteristic of these for-
mats is a good machine-readability.
However, text-intensive and semi-structured data is
of very little use for security experts due to its extent
and lack of human-readability. This is a major prob-
lem when taking the role of security experts in to-
day’s companies into consideration. As the success
and effectiveness of incident prevention, detection,
and reaction rely heavily on the knowledge of security
experts (Shackleford 2016; Luttgens et al. 2014), they
need to understand what happened, how to react ap-
propriately, and how to prevent new outbreaks of
cyberattacks.
Structured threat intelligence is of great value for
experts as it enables them to understand threats and
attacks. However, this is only possible when experts
are able to read and analyze this information. It is
further crucial for experts to easily edit it in order to
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include any additional or missing information. The
interaction requires an integrity-proof approach to
persist original data in order to ensure the availability
of untampered evidence for possible subsequent court
cases.
We propose KAVAS, a knowledge-assisted visual
analytics concept for the Structured Threat Informa-
tion eXpression (STIX). KAVAS enables security ex-
perts to analyze and enrich cyber threat intelligence
(CTI) data. We combine a novel way of persisting
this semistructured data in a graph-based database
with an interactive visualization. To demonstrate the
feasibility of KAVAS we utilize the state-of-the-art
format for structuring CTI information, STIX 2. Our
work aims to improve the accessibility of cyber threat
intelligence for security experts and to include them
in the process of creating a comprehensive documen-
tation for security incidents.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 introduces the background of our work with
regard to related research fields. In Section 3 we analyze
related work and reach out for introducing the ad-
dressed research gap. This chapter is followed by the de-
scription of applied concepts and design decisions we
made for KAVAS in Section 4. After introducing the
main concepts of KAVAS we proceed to showcase how
our approach works in Section 5. Section 6 qualitatively
evaluates the applied approach to make threat
intelligence accessible to security analysts. We conclude
in Section 7 by discussing our concept and identifying
future work.
Background
This section provides an overview of the Structured
Threat Information eXpression format STIX, which is
the state-of-the-art project for semi-structured represen-
tation of cyber threat intelligence information. Further-
more, a general view on knowledge and its role in the
field of visual analytics is given.
Structured threat information eXpression (STIX)
As argued above, structured formats are a key element
within the threat intelligence exchange process because
they pre-define which information can be shared.
Additionally, these formats define requirements for the
information density of the data to be shared. Depending
on the specific use-case and the required contentual ex-
tent, the literature provides several formats that sup-
port structuring threat intelligence information.
Examples for such formats are IODEF,1 VERIS,2 and
STIX.3 The primary focus of IODEF is the exchange of
incident information between Computer Emergency
Response Teams (CERTs), whereas VERIS focuses the
measurement and management of risks involved in
incidents. STIX 2, in contrast, is not bound to a specific
use case and provides a comprehensive tool set for the
representation of various information about incidents.
As it is the format with the broadest possibilities in ap-
plication (Menges and Pernul 2018), we focus our work
on STIX 2 as the most recent version of STIX. This
choice is further substantiated by STIX being the
de-facto standard format for the exchange of threat
intelligence information at present, which can also be
anticipated for its successor STIX 2 in the near future
(Shackleford 2015; Sauerwein et al. 2017). It provides
the most extensive data structures among the available
formats as shown by Asgarli et al. (Asgarli and Burger
2016) as well as by Menges and Pernul (Menges and
Pernul 2018). This allows a wide ranging integration of
expert knowledge into the analysis process. STIX 2 also
provides highly flexible data structures allowing inter-
actions of domain experts with very few limitations.
Regarding the content, STIX 2 provides a holistic rep-
resentation for incident information, which is structured
using the lightweight JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)
file format. The data format provides two core compo-
nent types: A STIX Domain Object (SDO) describing
the characteristics of an incident and a STIX Relation-
ship Object (SRO) describing relationships between
those characteristics.
In its current version, STIX 2 specifies SDO ele-
ments for the representation of the attacking entity,
event data describing the occurred incident as well as
countermeasures initiated by the victim entity. The
representation of the attacking entity includes infor-
mation about the threat actor, the objectives, tools
and attack patterns used within an attack. It also sup-
ports the description of entire attack campaigns and
the attribution of attackers to such campaigns. The
lateral movement of an incident can be represented
using information such as exploited vulnerabilities,
detected malware or digital identities involved in the
incident. Actions taken to prevent an attack as well
as responses to an attack can also be represented and
associated to corresponding incidents afterwards.
Furthermore, STIX 2 specifies SRO elements to dy-
namically connect SDO elements. These connections
can be realized using Relationship and Sighting Objects.
Relationship objects indicate dependencies between
SDOs, whereas Sighting objects refer to observed occur-
rences of SDOs. This allows building highly flexible rep-
resentations for incidents only limited by the SDO
definitions that are available within the data model (Pi-
azza et al. 2017a; Piazza et al. 2017b). To encapsulate
fully captured incidents, STIX 2 specifies an additional
bundle element encapsulating all SDO and SRO ele-
ments captured in the course of an incident. Listing 1
gives a short example of a STIX 2 bundle.
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This listing shows the two SDO elements threat-actor
and malware as well as the SRO element relationship,
which connects the SDO elements using its properties
source ref and target _ref. This example intends to illus-
trate the notation for objects and dependencies within the
format as well as to give an impression of the possible
complexity considering more extensive STIX 2 files.
Whenever the term “STIX” is used in the following
sections, we actually refer to STIX 2.
Knowledge-assisted visual analytics
Visual Analytics (VA) is a combination of two important
analytic reasoning processes: interactive visualization
and automated analysis both striving to gain new
insights (Keim et al. 2010). Keim et al. (Keim et al. 2008)
define the creation of insight or knowledge as the final
step in their widely accepted process for VA. This defin-
ition and other VA processes describe knowledge as a
solely human artifact. However, not only humans own
knowledge but a specific type of knowledge also exists
for any automated analysis method included in VA
(Fayyad et al. 2002; Sacha et al. 2014).
Therefore, knowledge-assisted visual analytics
distinguishes the terms explicit and tacit knowledge
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Polanyi 1983). Explicit
knowledge can be defined as machine knowledge
which can be read, processed, and stored by ma-
chines. Tacit knowledge is very specific to the individ-
ual and specialized as only humans are able to extract
this knowledge type. In the context of knowledgeas-
sisted visual analytics, tacit knowledge can be subdi-
vided into smaller notions: 1) operational knowledge
and 2) domain knowledge (Chen 2005). By having the
appropriate operational knowledge a user knows how
to interact with a visual analytics system. Domain or
context knowledge is the ability of a user to interpret
the visual representation regarding a specific context.
Only a combination of these two types of knowledge
enables users to understand the message told by a
visual analytics system and thus to derive new know-
ledge (Chen 2005). Knowledge-assisted visual analytics
aims to support the exchange of all these different
knowledge types.
These exchanges can be formally described using
knowledge conversion processes (Nonaka and Takeuchi
1995). Chen et al. (Chen et al. 2009) adapt these pro-
cesses for information visualization. Wang et al. (Wang
et al. 2009) as well as Federico et al. (Federico et al.
2017) further substantiate the concept of knowledge
conversion to visual analytics with a special focus on ex-
plicit knowledge. The four conversion processes are
namely: Internalization, Externalization, Combination,
and Collaboration.
Internalization in knowledge-assisted visualization en-
compasses the transformation of explicit knowledge to
tacit knowledge through visual interfaces. It supports
humans in order to understand and transform explicit
knowledge into domain knowledge (Wang et al. 2009).
From a visualization perspective, this process is similar
to the concepts of sensemaking (Pirolli and Card 2005)
and insight or knowledge generation (Sacha et al. 2014;
Chang et al. 2009). Internalization in terms of
visualization can be described as follows: explicit know-
ledge is visually represented and through interactive ex-
ploration users gain tacit knowledge. Internalization is a
high-level description of the generation of insight which
is the primary goal and process of any visualization
(Chen et al. 2009; Chang et al. 2009).
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Externalization describes the transfer of knowledge
along the opposite direction in contrast to internaliza-
tion. It is a process where tacit knowledge is translated
to explicit knowledge based on the insight of a user.
There are existing prototypes in the visualization com-
munity showing that visualization tools taking
externalization into consideration is suitable and effect-
ive for persisting and making use of experts’ domain
knowledge (Federico et al. 2017). Externalization can be
applied using two main approaches. First, the more fre-
quently applied approach is enabling users to directly
transfer their knowledge. There exists a range of possi-
bilities for implementing direct externalization. Exam-
ples are adjusting machine learning algorithms’
parameters (Theron et al. 2017), adding patterns and
rules to a knowledge database (Wagner et al. 2017) or
changing an ontology used by automated analysis
methods (Wang et al. 2009). Second, the other way to
implement externalization is an implicit one by inferring
explicit knowledge based on interactions of users with
the visualization (Endert et al. 2012; Zhong et al. 2018).
For example, dragging a node to a different location
could be used to update and adjust the model of a clus-
tering algorithm to fit the new position of the node.
Collaboration characterizes the exchange of tacit
knowledge between humans (Wang et al. 2009). This
process does not explicitly rely on computers and
visualization as the most common form of sharing
tacit knowledge is direct communication. However,
collaboration can be supported through visual inter-
faces and the possibilities to externalize tacit know-
ledge and therefore, making it accessible for others at
any time, supporting them to improve their own
knowledge (Coleman et al. 1996).
Combination is a process where explicit knowledge
from different sources is incorporated into an existing
explicit knowledge system. It helps to improve available
knowledge and to combine different bodies of explicit
knowledge. This process is mostly independent from any
visual representation of the explicit knowledge (Wang et
al. 2009). However, users are integrated into this process
by supporting the combination, identifying relations and
finding inconsistencies or redundancies.
The development of knowledge-based interfaces and
the representation of knowledge generated throughout
the entire analytical process has been declared a key
challenge for visual analytics research (Thomas and
Cook 2005; Pike et al. 2009). However, in the domain of
cyber security this is still underdeveloped.
Related work
Only few scientific publications tackle the problem of
making threat intelligence information understandable
for security experts by using visual interfaces. Even less
work is available in the area of visual analytics systems
specifically designed to display STIX.
Leichtnam et al. (Leichtnam et al. 2017) introduce a
visualization approach for heterogeneous data sources.
To transform the diverse data into a normalized model
they derive a proprietary data model inspired by STIX.
They build a visualization for their proprietary format.
However, a visual representation for complex threat
intelligence information documented with STIX itself is
not provided.
A visualization displaying STIX in its full comprehen-
siveness is built by the STIX community itself.4 This
visualization builds a visual representation of a STIX
bundle but lacks clear and structured design principles.
Especially the functionality for security experts to con-
vert their domain knowledge into machinereadable
threat intelligence knowledge is missing.
While there is ongoing research in the area of struc-
tured formats for cyber threat intelligence (e.g. STIX)
(Sauerwein et al. 2017) as well as knowledge-assisted vis-
ual analytics (Federico et al. 2017), there are, to the best
of our knowledge, no efforts towards combining these
two concepts in order to make threat intelligence infor-
mation accessible for security experts.
In order to address this research gap, we define the
following three requirements for our solution:
 R1 - Handling complex threat intelligence data:
Enable integrity preserving storage and management
of STIX as a notion of explicit knowledge in an
appropriate database system rather than processing
JSON files.
 R2 - Visual representation of STIX: Create an
interactive visualization for STIX-based CTI infor-
mation allowing security experts to derive know-
ledge and gain insights from an incident
documentation.
 R3 - Conversion of experts’ knowledge: Allow the
exchange of explicit knowledge and security experts’
tacit knowledge. Domain knowledge can be made
available in the semi-structured STIX description of
an incident by externalization. Therefore, the inci-
dent can be described more comprehensively and
experts can benefit from each other’s knowledge.
Our concept can be interpreted as a knowledge view
in the information visualization framework introduced
by Shrinivasan and van Wijk (Shrinivasan and van Wijk
2008) in 2008 to support analytical reasoning.
Concept and design
This section introduces the concept and design decisions
made for the two main components of KAVAS: its per-
sistence layer called Cyber Threat Intelligence Vault
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(CTI Vault) to store and manage STIX as well as the
corresponding visual analytics component to enable
users to understand and interact with complex threat
intelligence information. These concepts are aligned to
the previously defined key requirements for KAVAS.
CTI vault
Hereinafter, we propose a concept for the persistence and
handling of STIX cyber threat intelligence information.
R1 - handling complex threat intelligence data
STIX is designed as a graph-based model, which defines
its domain objects as graph nodes and their relationships
as edges. Therefore, we have chosen a graph database, as
underlying technology in order to persist intelligence
data appropriately.
The CTI Vault serves as an extensible knowledge
base, providing access for domain experts to the
threat intelligence information, which can be seen as a
notion of explicit knowledge. It represents a
structured data storage for gathering captured
incident data, which originate from individual files in
JSON format. It serves as a technical foundation for
storing incident information and additional domain
expert knowledge, such as perceived similarities,
differences and relationships between the different
incidents.
Due to the dynamic data structures of STIX, the storage
needs to provide capabilities for persisting data in a way
that allows the integration of arbitrary relationships be-
tween the stored entities. Another essential requirement
for the data storage is to assure integrity for the cap-
tured incident information. This is of special importance
as the threat intelligence information could serve as
piece of evidence in possible subsequent court cases.
Therefore, it has to be ensured that interactions with do-
main experts will not distort any of the captured data,
while preserving capabilities for enriching the captured
data with additional information simultaneously.
To achieve these requirements, a differentiation be-
tween inventory data and appended data has to be
made within the data storage. The inventory data, which
represents the data foundation for incident information,
describes all data that has been captured within an inci-
dent. The threat information contained in the stored en-
tities as well as their relationships may not be changed
after their initial storage and can consequently be con-
sidered constant. Therefore, this data has to be
read-only. However, this is different for the use of
appended data. These entities may be inserted, altered
and deleted at any time and are intended to be con-
nected with inventory data. Whenever information is
edited, it has to be ensured that none of the operations
performed on appended entities will influence the integ-
rity of the inventory data.
The proposed concept is influenced both by the de-
fined data structures within the STIX specification and
the requirements for an interaction of domain experts
with these data structures. However, the base require-
ment for the concept is the alignment to the STIX speci-
fication, to ensure the compatibility with the STIX data
structures. This preserves the ability to exchange threat
information with any endpoint compatible to STIX.
Considering the requirements defined above, we firstly
introduce an approach for persisting inventory data. This
will be achieved by mapping the data available in the
STIX data format, into a database representation.
The concept is subsequently extended by an approach
for enriching the inventory data with appended data
allowing the association of threat information to domain
expert knowledge. Summarizing, the concept for hand-
ling complex threat intelligence data is based on the fol-
lowing two requirements, which will be specified in
more detail afterwards.
 R1.1 - Structured storage for threat intelligence
data: The collected data is stored in a structured
way within a graph database as inventory data. The
data storage has to be aligned to the STIX
specification, allowing arbitrary relationships
between the stored entities.
 R1.2 - Integrity-proof storage and enrichment of
persisted data: A further requirement for the
storage of threat intelligence data is to guarantee
data integrity from insert operations onward.
Moreover, subsequent update operations of the
inventory data must not endanger its integrity.
Therefore, it is mandatory to introduce a
provenance process for every performed
enrichment.
R1.1 - structured storage for threat intelligence data
To realize a concept of storing inventory data into the
database, it is necessary to take a closer look at the STIX
specification as well as to consider possibilities for the
representation within a graph database.
The specification of STIX defines SDOs for the repre-
sentation of threat intelligence information on the one
hand and SROs defining relations between domain ob-
jects on the other hand. Both SDO and SRO are speci-
fied as stand-alone objects in STIX that allow to store
multiple properties. According to the specification, SRO
objects represent the relationships within the model by
holding additional properties pointing to a source and
target reference, each of which has to be a SDO. The
combination of SDOs and SROs builds a directed graph,
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in which the first ones represent graph node objects and
the latter ones represent edges connecting these nodes.
In contrast to this type of representation, graph data-
bases allow the use of object types for creating nodes,
whereas edges cannot be represented using object types.
This leads to the necessity of adjusting the type of repre-
sentation within the database in order to properly trans-
late STIX into the database representation. Our
approach for adjusting these interrelations between the
STIX objects is visualized in Fig. 1(a) and described in
more detail afterwards.
Our concept defines the representation of both SDO
and SRO as physical nodes within the graph database.
While SDOs act as self-sufficient nodes, SROs represent
the relationships between SDOs and, therefore, act add-
itionally as logical STIX edges. Finally, information
about the source and target attributes of the relationship
is transformed into physical edges realizing these rela-
tionships within the database. This leads to a representa-
tion that fully maintains the structural integrity of the
STIX data model on the one hand and allows to map re-
lationship properties into logical edges on the other
hand. Conclusively, this results in a logical representa-
tion for the directed-graph structure of STIX, which is
stored using a physical non-directed graph structure
within the database.
In addition to this, the STIX specification defines de-
tected incident information to be pooled in relation to a
root bundle element. Since the physical graph is
non-directed, the bundle element can be connected to
every SDO contained within an incident to achieve the
pooling. This element can serve as an entry point for the
traversal of incident information at the same time.
R1.2 - integrity-proof storage and enrichment of persisted
data
Within the process of storing data into the CTI Vault,
the integrity of captured data is essential to preserve its
evidential significance for any subsequent forensic ana-
lyses or even for court cases. The proposed concept pro-
vides two different mechanisms to guarantee the
integrity for stored incident information. On the one
hand, the integrity of incident information has to be en-
sured when it enters the system for the first time, on the
other hand, changes on persisted information have to be
conducted in an integrity preserving manner. The integ-
rity of inserted information is preserved using controlled
redundancies. Inserted information will intentionally not
be checked for redundancies to prevent any possible dis-
tortion of this data. The insertion of redundant data is
possible, since the graph database assigns an internal
unique identifier for every element inserted. This, in
turn, prevents objects with the same content from pro-
ducing collisions. However, delimitation for redundant
b
a
Fig. 1 CTI Vault of KAVAS. a Persisted Inventory Data (b) Enriched
Inventory Data
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objects remains still possible due to the pooling of ele-
ments and their affiliation to their root element, namely
their bundle. The only exception for this are insertions
of redundant elements within one bundle. However, this
would only be the case if the elements contain identical
STIX unique identifiers, which makes them both syntac-
tically and semantically identical and consequently leads
to a unification of these elements.
In addition to the concept of integrity-proof persisting
for inventory data, the CTI Vault is designed to provide
capabilities to store additional data that enriches the
available information with domain knowledge of experts.
Therefore, it needs to enable the extension of existing
objects and relationships of inventory data. Since the en-
richment of data with domain expert knowledge is not
necessarily a singular event, the database also needs to
provide capabilities for historicization of all performed
changes.
As stated above, the concept of enriching inventory
data is based on two main requirements. It has to be en-
sured that the inventory data will not be altered at any
time and that the enriched data is still fully compatible
to the STIX 2 specification. Consequently, the concept
for enriching inventory data is also based on the STIX
data structures.
According to this, only valid SDO or SRO elements
that meet the STIX specification may be appended to
the inventory data. Similar to the persistence of inven-
tory data, appended data is also structured based on
SDO nodes that are connected using logical and physical
edges respectively. This results in a consistent database
structure.
Figure 1(b) shows an exemplary SDO element within
the inventory data extended by two subsequent changes,
which are realized using a versioning structure within
the database. In this process, supplementary nodes are
added for each change. To indicate that nodes have been
overwritten, the CTI Vault flags the respective former
versions as “revoked” according to the STIX specifica-
tion (Piazza et al. 2017b).
The first change is realized by creating a version
SDO-v1 that extends the information within the original
SDO, which is part of the inventory data. SDO-v1 in
turn is connected to its base entity using a newly created
relationship object SRO-v1. The second change is real-
ized by creating a further version SDO-v2 and a corre-
sponding relationship SRO-v2. It is important to
maintain the order of succession for all changes per-
formed. As a result, this concept enables every node
within the inventory data to carry its own chain of edi-
ted data.
The presented concept for persisting cyber threat
intelligence information in the STIX format fulfills
therefore our requirement R1. This concept is the basis
to support the Combination process as we interpret the
STIX information stored in the CTI Vault to be explicit
knowledge (Chen et al. 2009; Ackoff 1989).
Visualization design
The visual analytics component enables security experts
to analyze, understand, and edit threat intelligence infor-
mation. As described in Section 2.1, STIX is a powerful
but text-intensive and semi-structured threat intelligence
format. A single bundle can easily reach thousands of
lines for complex incidents. This makes the documenta-
tion very hard to analyze and understand for security ex-
perts. This gets even worse when an expert appends
information to the STIX file. In order to externalize do-
main knowledge, the complex structure of the format in-
cluding all possible objects, relationships, their
attributes, and allowed values for the attributes has to be
known. To support the tasks of analyzing and enriching
threat intelligence documented in STIX, we developed a
visual analytics component on top of the previously in-
troduced CTI vault.
Figure 2 shows the visualization component in the
overall context of the system and defines the relations
between KAVAS and security experts: the visualization
uses the explicit knowledge stored in the CTI vault and
maps this knowledge into an interactive view using the
specification. The security experts can perceive the dis-
played knowledge to gain insight and situational aware-
ness (Yen et al. 2014). At the same time they can use
their operational knowledge to interact with the
visualization in order to adjust the view specification or
to enrich the information stored in the CTI vault.
R2 - visual representation of STIX
As STIX is designed to be a connected and directed
graph of nodes and edges we are using a directed
node-link diagram to represent knowledge persisted in
the CTI Vault (Piazza et al. 2017a). This visualization
technique is well suited for understanding threat
intelligence as it reveals interconnections using nodes
and edges (Severino 2018; Heer et al. 2010). Revealing
the relationship between specific nodes (e.g. threat ac-
tors, used attack patterns and the targeted entities) is a
crucial task of experts analyzing STIX. This makes the
node-link diagram appropriate for the data structure at
hand. However, Marty (Marty 2009) as well as Card et
al. (Card et al. 1999) identify two main challenges when
using node-link diagrams. To address those and to en-
sure the design of a suitable visual representation of
STIX, we need to fulfill the following more specific
requirements:
 R2.1 - Render complex threat intelligence: The
cyber threat intelligence persisted in the IoC Vault
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is displayed in a suitable visual representation. The
visual representation is fully capable to parse, map,
and render all information provided in STIX bundles
according to the STIX specification.
 R2.2 - Scalable visual display: As STIX bundles
can contain hundreds of objects and even more links
between these objects, the visual display has to be
scalable. This can be assured by an appropriate
layout algorithm and interactions for the users to
adjust the layout.
 R2.3 - Exploratory analysis: To allow that users
can deduce tacit knowledge from the displayed
explicit knowledge, the visual representation must
provide interactions supporting the analytical
process of users.
R2.1 - render complex threat intelligence
The first challenge is to identify an appropriate way for
positioning the nodes and links in the visualization
space. SDO and SRO are abstract data constructs and do
not have any natural position like on a geographical
map. The InfoVis pipeline introduced by Card et al.
(Card et al. 1999) is a process for creating views based
on abstract data. By applying this process to SDOs and
SROs, we are able to generate a visual representation of
STIX. The following paragraphs describe our adaption
of the InfoVis pipeline.
Originally, the pipeline starts with a data analysis re-
sponsible for data cleansing or interpolating missing
values. We omit this step in our visual component as
the CTI Vault is designed to persist only semantically
and syntactically correct STIX bundles. Therefore, our
view generation process starts with filtering the data to
be visualized, as shown in the Visualization-box in Fig. 2.
Filtering is realized by receiving a single userselected
STIX bundle from the vault. This ensures that the ana-
lyst only sees information related to the bundle of inter-
est. According to the InfoVis pipeline this single STIX
bundle and the corresponding objects are referred to as
focus data (Card et al. 1999).
The STIX objects in the focus data do not have any
available positioning in the visualization space yet.
Therefore, we need to transform the STIX-specific data
structure into displayable nodes and edges in a
mapping-step. As the STIX format defines SDOs to be
nodes and SROs to be links in its graph-based structure,
we adopt this definition. However, we had to make ad-
justments to improve the comprehensibility of a visually
represented STIX bundle. We are displaying not only
SROs as links in the node-link diagram but also import-
ant relationships embedded into SDOs referencing other
objects. These embedded relationships are important to
understand underlying connections in the threat
intelligence information. For example, when an incident
report is documented with STIX, embedded relation-
ships of the report highlight which objects the report re-
fers to. This and similar information can be important to
an expert when analyzing an incident. To allow a fast
perception of embedded links, we decided to include
embedded relationships of SDOs as specially denoted
edges into the diagram.
Additionally, we had to adjust the way STIX Sighting
objects are represented in our visualization to retain a
visually understandable way of representing STIX. These
objects denote the insight that an attack, threat actor,
campaign or other domain object was seen (Piazza et al.
2017b). They are used whenever an already documented
attack is identified at another entity as well. Therefore,
they are applied to track who was targeted as well as
which attacks were performed. A Sighting object is spe-
cified to be a relationship. This means it would appear
as a link in the visual representation although a Sighting
is only connected to other SDOs via embedded relation-
ships. We decided to include Sightings as nodes which
are connected to SDOs via their different embedded re-
lationships in the visual STIX representation to improve
the perception of Sightings. These design decisions en-
able rendering all STIX objects as nodes and links on
the canvas.
R2.2 - scalable visual display
Another issue of node-link diagrams is their limited scal-
ability in terms of large numbers of highly connected
nodes. They tend to resemble hairballs which makes it
hard for users to understand the displayed information.
Fig. 2 High-level structure of KAVAS
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STIX bundles with large numbers of SDOs and SROs
hamper a fast visual perception of relationships between
the objects. However, a well-chosen layout algorithm
and interactive functionalities for experts to adjust the
layout can reduce this problem (Marty 2009). These
functionalities are of great importance to ensure that a
user is able to customize the visual representation of the
STIX bundle. To arrange the information appropriately
on the visualization canvas we apply a force-directed
graph layout (Kobourov 2010). This algorithm creates a
node-link diagram driven by different forces (e.g. gravity
of node clusters, strength of links), which avoids over-
lapping as far as possible. However, due to the possible
size and complexity of highly-interconnected STIX inci-
dent representations, it is necessary to provide inter-
active functionalities for security experts to adjust the
layout themselves. This is especially necessary, when the
automated force-directed algorithm is not capable to
render a feasible layout anymore. In KAVAS we imple-
ment interactions allowing users to drag and drop single
nodes and pin them to the desired position. Additionally,
users can browse into specific parts of the STIX bundle
by zooming. If the amount of nodes is overstraining the
user, filters can be applied to show and hide the different
types of SDOs and SROs.
R2.3 - exploratory analysis
Our concept allows security experts to interactively ex-
plore visually represented incident documentation. This
exploratory analysis follows the Information Seeking
Mantra defined by Shneiderman: “Overview first, zoom
and filter, details on demand” (Shneiderman 1996). The
Overview is provided by the initially generated node-link
diagram based on the STIX intelligence information.
With common interaction patterns like Pan-and-Zoom,
hovering actions, filtering and Drag and Drop, security
experts can adjust the view (Heer and Shneiderman
2012). This fulfills the Zoom and filterrequirement of
Shneiderman’s mantra. Details on demand are displayed
when an element of the node-link diagram is selected.
By analyzing the visual STIX representation users
broaden both their operational knowledge and their do-
main knowledge (Chen et al. 2009).
By implementing R2.1, R2.2, and R2.3 in our ap-
proach, we are able to provide an interactive visual rep-
resentation of the explicit knowledge embedded in the
threat intelligence.
R3 - conversion of experts’ knowledge
KAVAS allows the enrichment and editing of cyber
threat intelligence while preserving the integrity of the
original information at the same time. The enrichment
and editing is necessary to externalize any additional or
missing information from the user’s domain knowledge.
Preserving the integrity throughout this editing action
allows the intelligence to serve as piece of evidence. In
our approach, security experts are able to externalize
their domain knowledge either through changing the at-
tributes of existing SDOs and SROs or through adding
new nodes and links. This functionality covers the
Externalization process as users are able to transfer their
domain knowledge to the CTI Vault, where it is pre-
served as explicit knowledge.
Our concept supports the Collaboration of several se-
curity experts by transforming it to explicit knowledge.
This explicit knowledge can then be displayed to other
users, which could further support them in their analysis
of the incident. Thus, experts editing existing intelligence
implicitly make their domain knowledge accessible for
other users.
Visualization architecture
We adopted the classical Model-View-Controller
(MVC) design pattern for the visual analytics compo-
nent (Krasner and Pope 2000). This divides the appli-
cation into three main interconnected parts to
separate the internal representation of information
and business logic from the visual presentation to a
user. Figure 3 shows a high-level view on the MVC
structure of the KAVAS visualization component. The
MVC-structure of KAVAS shown in the figure is also
aligned with the different steps of the InfoVis pipeline
described earlier.
The Database Connector is the interface towards the
available web services of the CTI vault enabling the
visualization to retrieve threat intelligence data. It also
enables the visualization to send updates to the database
in case a security expert edited the STIX documentation.
The visualization exchanges STIX-based documentations
in JSON format with the vault.
The STIX Parser receives the JSON file from the
Database Connector. It is responsible for parsing the
file into instances of the SRO and the SDO data
models. Both these models inherit a number of com-
mon properties every STIX object must contain. The
models are specified in accordance with the STIX 2
specification (Piazza et al. 2017b). In addition to the
simple attribute values, our models define the data
type of the property and a description for the proper-
ties. They also define whether a property is required.
All this information is extracted from the STIX speci-
fication to be able to parse CTI information from the
vault and to create valid STIX documentations based
on changes made by security experts. The model in-
stances are held by the parser in two different lists;
one containing relationship objects and the other
containing domain objects. Parsing JSON into object
instances has two main advantages: easy mapping and
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rendering of objects into a node-link diagram as well
as assuring compliance of processed STIX objects
with the specification.
As pointed out earlier the abstract STIX data has no
position in the diagram yet. The STIX Mapper maps the
parsed STIX objects onto the visualization canvas. It
wraps every instance of the beforehand described STIX
models with a NodeType or LinkType. These data models
contain additional properties (e.g. position, movement
speed, etc.) to enable the NodeLink Controller to render
the NodeLink View, which displays the interactive visual
STIX representation. The View Specification tells the
NodeLink Controller important settings such as the
current zoom factor, gravity, link length, node radius
and others.
The details of any STIX object can now be shown by
handing over the selected NodeType to the ObjectDetails
Controller. This controller then queries the object lists
of the STIX Parser to receive the corresponding STIX
object instance. This instance is forwarded to the
ObjectDetails View for displaying details-on-demand.
When an expert edits the STIX description, the parser
receives the changes from the controllers, changes the
model if necessary and forwards the changes through to
the Database Connector to the CTI vault.
Prototype
In the following paragraphs we explain applied technolo-
gies for implementing KAVAS and give some detail of
its functionalities with a short and small-scaled working
exemplary bundle. A prototype of KAVAS is available
here: http://bit.ly/2v9mSna (Sauerwein et al. 2017).
Please note that KAVAS is currently an academic proto-
type. The linked version serves as a proof of concept.
We are aware of required improvements to allow the op-
erative use of KAVAS. The most emergent improve-
ments are scoped for further versions of KAVAS and are
described at the end of this article.
Applied technologies
The KAVAS visual analytics component is exclusively
based on open-source web technologies forming a
client-server web application in combination with the
CTI vault (see Fig. 4). The CTI vault serves as back-end,
providing the underlying data storage as described in
Section 4.1 in combination with an API that enables
data access for the front-end application. The vault is re-
alized using the Java-based graph database Neo4j
(Asgarli and Burger 2016) as base technology. Conse-
quently, we also chose Java as language for realizing the
access to the database as well as the related business
logic managing the access. This layer assures the compli-
ance to the object constraints predetermined by STIX,
such as the specified object definitions and relationships.
This is necessary, since the graph database does not
provide such capabilities. In order to provide web-based
access to the storage application, the actual Java imple-
mentation is running on a JavaEE5 based application ser-
ver. This allows us to provide REST webservices that
can be accessed from the front-end application. The
main technologies on the front-end are Angular.io6 and
Angular Material7 which are frameworks on top of
Fig. 3 MVC-based architecture of KAVAS’ visualization
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HTML5, CSS3 and JavaScript. The interactive node-link
diagram is implemented using the D3.js8-library.
Interactive exploration
Figure 5 displays different views of the visual interface of
KAVAS. The bundle shown in the figure is part of the
official example data sets for STIX 2.9 Figure 5(a) shows
the main view of the KAVAS visualization: an overview
of a STIX bundle displayed as node-link diagram. The
bundle itself documents an advanced persistent threat
targeting the Branistan Peoples Party (BPP) which is one
of the political parties of Branistan, a fictional country.
The BPP’s homepage is hit by an attack named Oper-
ation Bran Flakes where adversaries deploy Content
Spoofing trying to insert false information into the BPP’s
web page. The campaign is rolled out by a Fake BPP
which is most certainly sponsored by the Franistan
Intelligence service, whereby Franistan is considered an-
other fictional country. The MITRE Corporation de-
tected and documented the attack.
An expert gets an overview (see Fig. 5(a)) of the STIX
description in the node-link diagram after selecting the
STIX bundle in the tool-bar’s drop-down menu. The se-
lected bundle is then received from the CTI vault,
parsed and transformed for the visual display. To get a
first glance of the documented incident, the expert can
Pan-and-Zoom the diagram as well as drag and pin
nodes to a fixed location on the canvas. Panning and
zooming allows for interactive exploration. Dragging
nodes across the canvas and pinning them to specific lo-
cations helps the analyst with adjusting the node-link
diagram to be well arranged even for large numbers of
nodes and edges. Whenever the mouse is moved over a
node, KAVAS highlights the nearest neighbors of this
node (see Fig. 5(b)). With enabling experts to select a
node or link of the diagram and displaying the detailed
properties of this STIX object (see Fig. 5(c)), KAVAS
fully implements the Information Seeking Mantra for
threat intelligence information.
Embedded relationships are not displayed as separated
edges in Fig. 5(a). This is another functionality imple-
mented in the visualization component. As described
earlier, we map the embedded relationships of STIX ob-
jects as specially denoted edges. However, displaying all
embedded relationships leads to incomprehensible dia-
grams very fast. Therefore, the embedded links as well
as all other node or link types can be hidden or dis-
played interactively by the user.
Editing and enriching CTI information
Analysts can enable editing whenever they want to
change or add any information to the bundle. When this
mode is activated the view itself stays the same to keep
the analyst in the existing visual metaphor. However, the
interaction behavior is different. Clicking on the blank
canvas now triggers the process for adding a node to the
diagram. The first step in this process is selecting the
STIX object type as it defines the properties of the SDO.
KAVAS adds the node to the SDO list in the STIX
parser and displays it on the canvas. Afterwards, the tool
brings up the details-on-demand window and the user
can now edit the information for the newly added
object.
Instead of dragging a node as described earlier, click-
ing and moving the mouse with a node triggers the
process of adding an SRO while in Editing-mode. If the
mouse is released on a node, a new edge, with the start-
ing node as source and the ending node as target is
added to the canvas. From here on, the process for add-
ing the SRO to the parser and the canvas is similar to
adding a SDO. Finally, the user sees the newly created
link highlighted and the editable details-ondemand
window.
By clicking an existing node or link in editing mode
the properties of this STIX object can be changed except
for some properties, which by definition should not be
element to any changes throughout the whole life-cycle
of an object (e.g. its ID).
After the user clicks to save in the details-on-demand
window, the input is checked for its conformity with the
STIX specification. If the object is conform it is parsed
into a compliant JSON. This happens regardless of
whether a new object is added or an existing one is
changed. Afterwards the JSON is sent to the CTI vault
where the data is persisted.
When an expert starts editing a STIX bundle, this spe-
cific bundle is locked in the IoC Vault. Other users can
still load the bundle from the vault to analyze the corre-
sponding node-link diagram. However, they cannot
switch to editing mode and they are notified that the
bundle is currently edited by another user if they try to
edit the bundle. When the editing user finishes the work
on the bundle or closes the browser, the bundle is
unlocked in the vault. This is possible as changes to the
bundle are only possible on the level of SDOs and SROs
which have to be saved separately after they were
Fig. 4 Technologies used in KAVAS
Böhm et al. Cybersecurity            (2018) 1:16 Page 11 of 19
Fig. 5 Phases of Information Seeking Mantra in KAVAS A prototype of KAVAS is available at http://bit.ly/2v9mSna. The displayed bundle’s id is
bundle–81,810,123-b298-40f6-a4e7-186efcd07670 and it can be accessed via the drop-down menu in the toolbar of KAVAS. a Overview (b) Zoom
and Filter (c) Details on Demand
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changed. Other users are now notified that the bundle is
not locked anymore. When they activate the editing
mode, the bundle is reloaded from the vault to ensure
that they are working on the most recent version. They
also can reload the bundle manually without switching
the mode of action when they do not want to edit any-
thing but still want to analyze the latest version of the
STIX bundle.
Embedded knowledge processes
The KAVAS prototype is designed and implemented
after a knowledge-assisted visualization approach.
Therefore, the four knowledge conversion processes can
be clearly identified within KAVAS’ functionalities:
 Internalization: This knowledge conversion process
describes the transfer of explicit knowledge into tacit
knowledge through visual interfaces supporting
humans to understand the explicit knowledge.
KAVAS provides an interactive visual representation
of explicit knowledge encompassed in the threat
intelligence. In our system, internalization mainly
happens through the interactive exploration of
users. The node-link diagram and interaction
functionalities aligned with the Information Seeking
Mantra help users to inspect the knowledge and further
support the discovery of unknown relationships and
patterns which can become new domain knowledge.
 Externalization: Our concept allows tacit knowledge
of domain experts to be externalized and persisted
as explicit knowledge. Users can insert domain
knowledge that does not yet exist in the threat
intelligence information. Regardless of where the
missing domain knowledge is originating, once
acquired by the user, it can be directly inserted into
the STIX bundle to augment threat intelligence.
KAVAS allows this process through implementing
means for users to directly edit the displayed STIX
objects or add missing ones. Newly added
information is persisted in the CTI Vault. After
previously existing intelligence is changed, the
original information is kept and linked to the
updated version to ensure traceability of any
changes to the STIX bundle.
 Collaboration: This process emerges when a user
analyzes intelligence, which contains the
externalized knowledge of other users. All available
STIX information is persisted in the central CTI
Vault and all intelligence displayed to the users is
retrieved from this central intelligence storage.
When one domain expert changes an incident
description by editing existing intelligence or adding
new pieces of information, this externalized
knowledge is available for all other experts.
Accordingly, having the CTI Vault as a centralized
storage structure for all STIX intelligence and
enabling users to externalize their domain
knowledge, KAVAS supports the collaborative
generation of tacit knowledge among its users.
 Combination: This process encompasses the
insertion of new explicit knowledge into our existing
knowledge base (CTI Vault), which is able to
process any valid STIX bundle and to persist it. As a
first step, it is highly important that the original
bundle is stored regardless whether its information
elements overlap with existing bundles. Hence, the
bundle can be held in its original form and remains
useful as possible evidence in court. After the initial
storage of the original intelligence, further measures
can be applied to detect and remove inconsistencies
or redundancies. Currently, those measures are not
yet part of the CTI Vault. However, the combination
of existing explicit knowledge with new knowledge
can be realized with our concept of the CTI Vault.
Evaluation
To validate our prototypical implementation of KAVAS
and to provide first evidence of its usability and suitabil-
ity to support knowledge conversion, we followed a
two-fold research approach. An anonymous analyst sur-
vey validates the general suitability of the visualization
approach for the addressed problem and eliminates us-
ability issues of the interface. The survey is followed by
expert interviews to confirm that KAVAS can facilitate
knowledge conversions between domain experts and
cyber threat intelligence.
Analyst survey
This survey intends to validate the relevance of the ini-
tial problem and the suitability of our design approach.
Although, the survey cannot validate that the
visualization facilitates all four knowledge conversion
processes, it provides some hints whether the process of
internalization is appropriately tackled.
Participants
The survey involved twelve security analysts from differ-
ent academic institutions and companies such as inter-
net service providers and security consultancies. The
participants have a general understanding of threat
intelligence. However, none of them is currently working
with structured formats like STIX.
Design & Procedure
Staheli et al. (Staheli et al. 2014) propose a set of differ-
ent aspects to evaluate visualizations for cyber security.
Many of these aspects would need a more thorough user
study. However, our survey is meant to give a first
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indication on the suitability of KAVAS for making cyber
threat intelligence accessible for human analysts. Based
on the definitions proposed by Staheli et al. (Staheli et
al. 2014) we assess the dimensions User experience, Us-
ability and Learnability, Insight generation, and Feature
set utility. The questionnaire encloses questions with in-
formal character. Nevertheless, all questions are an-
swered on an interval Likert scale ranging from 1 to 5
with the first and last numerical value being labeled with
a textual description indicating the scale from 1: not at
all to 5: quite a lot. The questionnaire includes the fol-
lowing five questions:
 Q1: Is the analysis and understanding of incidents
relevant for your company/institution?
 Q2: Is the proposed visual tool effective for an
investigation of threat intelligence information?
 Q3: Is the proposed visual tool clear and
understandable?
 Q4: Is the proposed visual tool adequate to display
and enrich the available incident information?
 Q5: Does the tool overall help to understand what
happened during the described incident?
An additional open field allows participants to report
any further comments or suggestions on the tool.
Before the beginning of the survey, the analysts are in-
troduced to the tool, its features and our motivation to
build it. Subsequently, a JSON representation of a syn-
thetic incident as described in Section 5.2 is shown. By
using the JSON representation we are able to highlight
the main problem with STIX-based intelligence, which is
the low readability and accessibility of the format. After-
wards, the participants explore the incident freely and
are asked to fill out the questionnaire.
Results
Considering Fig. 6 and Table 1 we derive the fact that
the addressed problem is relevant for the respective
company or institution of the analysts. The high
standard deviation leads to the conclusion that the
need for sharing, exchanging, and analyzing threat
intelligence is not prevalent throughout the participat-
ing organizations yet. The feedback on Q2 shows that
a visual representation of threat intelligence is highly
preferred over a text-based representation. From the
answers to our third question about the usability of
the proposed tool, we can conclude that the tool is
indeed usable. However, we received some suggestions
for improvement. Especially the analysts who
answered Q3 with a score of 3 or lower, provided
helpful feedback. For instance, one comment recom-
mended that nodes should not bump back to their
original position after dragging to adjust the layout of
the node-link diagram permanently. This and further
received feedback was implemented into the subse-
quent version of KAVAS after this survey and before
the expert interviews. Feedback to the tool’s suitability
and adequacy with respect to editing threat
intelligence information (Q4) is very positive, as well.
Moreover, the feedback to Question Q5 shows that
KAVAS improves the understanding of incidents
within the target group.
Expert interviews
In order to get in-depth insight into the support of the
knowledge-assisted concepts in KAVAS, we implemented
the suggestions for improvement from the survey and
used the revised prototype for interviews with security ex-
perts to conduct a more detailed evaluation. The main
goal of these interviews is to validate that KAVAS helps
security experts to understand threat intelligence and that
existing information can be enriched with expert domain
knowledge. By showing the fulfillment of our prototype in
terms of these two requirements, we can confirm that
KAVAS indeed facilitates the internalization and
externalization knowledge conversion processes. The
remaining knowledge conversion processes, combination
and collaboration, both are implicitly implemented in
KAVAS: Threat intelligence can be inserted into the CTI
Vault at any time through an API (Combination).
Additionally, experts can collaboratively gain knowledge
through externalizing their knowledge and making it ac-
cessible for other users (Collaboration). Therefore, our in-
terviews focus on the internalization and externalization
knowledge conversion process.
Participants
The interviewees are represented by five security experts
from different sectors. We conducted interviews with a
Chief Information Security Officer and a security analyst
of an international machine manufacturer, with a Chief
Technology Officer of a SME operating in the area of se-
cure cloud services, with a consultant from a security
consultancy as well as with an academic researcher in
the field of IT security. None of the experts participated
in the previous survey. Each participant has a medium
to high knowledge regarding threat intelligence, while
three of them deal with threat intelligence and related
structured formats like STIX on a daily basis. However,
none of the interviewed experts obtains a visual repre-
sentation to facilitate this work.
Design & Procedure
The interviews with the experts are designed to follow a
semi-structured approach according to Lazar et al.
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(Lazar et al. 2010). The interviews are separated into the
following four phases:
 Phase 1) Introduction: At the beginning, every
participant is questioned about their experience,
such as their knowledge on CTI in general and on
STIX. Afterwards, each expert receives a brief
introduction into the STIX format and its problem
of readability and accessibility. Thereby, the experts
are asked to criticize any potential issues throughout
the following interview phases. Next, each
interviewee is guided to our prototypical web
application. During the whole interview, the screen,
of the participant using the tool, is shared with the
interviewers.
 Phase 2) Internalization: To be able to test the
intuitivity of the explorative analysis capabilities of
KAVAS, the different interactive functionalities are
not introduced in detail. The participants are asked
to open a synthetic, previously designed STIX
bundle (7 nodes, 8 links)10 and to try to understand
what happened in this bundle using the visual
representation. In this phase, we pay special
attention to the usage of interactions as well as to
how the expert try to gain insight. After this first
contact with KAVAS, the focus of the interview
switches to a much more extensive bundle (65
nodes, 90 links).11 With this bundle, we aim to
discuss the scalability of the visual display in terms
of the layout algorithm and the available interactions
to adjust the layout. To conclude this phase of the
interviews we ask for the experts’ opinion on the
tool so far and whether it supported them in
understanding the threat intelligence information.
 Phase 3) Externalization: The focus of this phase is
to test KAVAS’ suitability to facilitate the
externalization of domain knowledge, or more
specifically, the insertion of new information and the
modification of existing intelligence. To validate this
with the interviewees, we provide a number of
additional pieces of information and ask them to add
this information to the previously explored smaller
bundle. Again, we request them to give us feedback
and criticize the tool whenever they have problems
in understanding how it is working.
 Phase 4) Wrap-Up: The last phase of the interviews
is dedicated to a summarizing discussion. Here, we
discuss with the participant whether a more
advanced version of KAVAS would be applicable to
operative deployment and the conditions thereto.
Finally, we collect a list of features and functionalities
the interviewees find useful for improving the
prototype.
Results
The interviews lasted between 45 to 70min, which was
mainly due to the summarizing discussion, where the ex-
perts brought up a lot of interesting points reaching
from possible improvements of STIX itself to functional-
ity features of KAVAS necessary for operative deploy-
ment in an organization. The results of the conducted
Fig. 6 Box plot reporting the KAVAS evaluation results. Solid lines mark the mean while dashed lines highlight the median
Table 1 KAVAS survey results
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
# Answers 12 12 12 12 12
Mean 3.83 4.67 4.17 4.58 4.17
Std dev 1.34 0.49 0.94 0.51 0.58
Min 1 4 3 4 3
Median 4 5 5 5 4
Max 5 5 5 5 5
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interviews are presented in the following, divided ac-
cording to the four phases described before.
 Phase 1) Introduction: At the beginning of each
interview the participants are asked general
questions to obtain basic data about the
interviewees. Therefore, they are asked about their
company as well as their exact role within the
company. Furthermore, they are asked about their
knowledge of Cyber Threat Intelligence and the
STIX format in particular to determine their level of
expertise. This first phase showed, that even though
interviewees are familiar with threat intelligence
information in general, they are rather unfamiliar
with the specifics of the STIX format in most cases.
Table 2 gives an overview on these general
information about the interviewees.
 Phase 2) Internalization: Within this phase, the
interviewees are asked to take a look at a predefined
STIX bundle and to understand the contents of the
presented incident. The interviews showed that
KAVAS supports users to quickly understand an
incident without having any previous knowledge.
Especially the included filter functions of KAVAS
turned out to be particularly helpful in this context.
The consistently positive feedback within this phase
showed, that the chosen representation is both
suitable for representing incident information and
makes it easily available for the user.
However, this phase also revealed some
disadvantages and problems with the graph
visualization in general and the realization in
particular. While hassle-free usage was possible
on large resolution displays, it turned out that
problems arise when working on lower resolution
displays, especially for handling larger datasets. The
interviewees also missed some functionalities. For
instance, they asked for advanced filter functions
for different use-cases such as filtering the k-
nearest neighbor nodes within specific tree sections.
The interviews further revealed that existing filters
and possible interactions with the user interface to
re-structure the layout prove themselves as very
useful features. It was also shown that the interface
could be improved by implementing some add-
itional features, such as on-demand windows dis-
playing further information for objects with their
associated relationships and an improved initial
structuring of the presented graph representation.
Altogether, the interviews show that KAVAS has a
high utility for security specialists to convey and
understand incident information. This manifested
both in the assessment of the approach in general
and the usability of the tool itself. However, it was
also stated that a special training for employees
might be necessary to cope with the complexity of
STIX data. The interviewees also considered the
tool to probably be helpful for practical usage. In
this context they could for example think of a feed
service to obtain incident information from a cen-
tral authority, which could be used to understand
attacks and prevent them from happening.
 Phase 3) Externalization: Within this phase, the
interviewees are asked to use KAVAS to enrich
the incident representation with additional,
predefined knowledge made available by the
interviewers. The process of editing information
overall turned out to be mostly intuitive and easy
to use for the experts.
Adding and editing nodes was perceived as
intuitive by all participants, whereas some
participants argued that editing relationships was a
bit counter-intuitive when working with the tool
for the first time. The fact that KAVAS distin-
guishes between explore and edit mode was per-
ceived differently by the participants. While some
accentuated the benefits of this clear separation,
others found it cumbersome. However, the tool
could be helpful to collect and enrich forensic evi-
dence in e.g. CERT or incident response teams
reconstructing how an incident compromised an
organization. In this context, it was envisioned
that this tool could especially be helpful within
team meetings to collaboratively collect and edit
threat intelligence information. It was also accen-
tuated that there is most likely a need for
integrity-proof intelligence data in the foreseeable
future. Altogether, the enrichment of intelligence
data was overall easy to use for the participants
and mostly intuitive. The interview reveals that
editing intelligence information is equally import-
ant to analyzing it. Moreover, the interviewees
highlighted that there is an actual need for this
feature within companies.
 Phase 4) Wrap-Up: Within the last phase, possible
scenarios and conditions for an operative deploy-
ment of KAVAS and possible improvements for the
prototype were discussed.
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One key problem revealed by the interviews is the
question how threat intelligence data can be
acquired. This concerns both the acquisition from
external sources and the question how threat
intelligence data can be produced within the
company. In this context, it was also argued that
there is a need for an automated generation of basic
intelligence data that can be enriched by experts
using tools like KAVAS afterwards. Integrating
external intelligence feeds, cooperatively analyzing
threat data as well as creating visual threat reports
seems to be beneficial for companies. The
interviewees also suggested several additional
features to improve the user interface. These, for
example, include improved highlighting for
important and editable attributes or additional filter
functions. Furthermore, the interviewees named
some additional object properties that were
necessary for practical usage, such as additional
timestamps defining the point in time when the
object was detected. These are not defined within
the current STIX standard and consequently not
available in KAVAS.
Discussion
The results of the conducted interviews show that
KAVAS provides the ability for internalization and
externalization of threat intelligence information. Given
the fact, that it is still in the stage of a proof of concept
prototype, the experts’ feedback was already good. Fur-
thermore, the experts provided several suggestions for
future improvements of the tool.
The interviews also demonstrated that there is a
strong interest for visualizing threat intelligence infor-
mation among companies. The experts already have sev-
eral use-cases for this kind of application in mind.
However, the question of how to generate intelligence
data in the first place remains.
Moreover, the interviews also showed that there are
several weaknesses in the STIX standard, which became
obvious while evaluating KAVAS. An example for this is
the absence of a top-level element to represent and
structure specific company assets such as IT systems af-
fected by an incident.
Conclusion and future work
Conclusion
In this work we presented KAVAS, a concept for inter-
active visual analytics of threat intelligence information.
Our approach persists information in a graph database
to maintain an integrity-preserving data structure. This
database is connected to a visual interface supporting se-
curity experts in understanding and analyzing incident
descriptions. Additionally, the visual analytics compo-
nent of KAVAS facilitates the process of including the
knowledge of the security experts into CTI information.
KAVAS achieves this with its functionalities to edit exist-
ing descriptions and adding new knowledge allowing for
more thorough incident documentations.
While designing KAVAS, and especially its visual compo-
nent, we aimed to follow the concept of knowledge-assisted
visual analytics. More precisely we designed our concept to
support the four main knowledge conversion processes
which are essential to improve the collaboration of human
and machines. Internalization is done in KAVAS by visually
representing the incident documentations stored in the
CTI vault. This way, the explicit knowledge in the CTI
vault is accessible for security experts and they can gain
knowledge using the visualization. KAVAS also supports
Externalization as it allows for editing the STIX bundles.
The tacit knowledge is externalized when the expert edits
the threat intelligence information visually displayed in
KAVAS. Being implemented as graph database the CTI
vault has the essential functionalities to support the Com-
bination knowledge conversion. This process is imple-
mented in KAVAS as the CTI vault can be fed with new
threat intelligence information and it includes this newly
available knowledge into the existing knowledge base. A
similar process in KAVAS supports the Collaboration. As
externalization of an expert’s tacit knowledge is possible,
other security experts can profit from the externalized
knowledge of each other providing an implicit form of
collaboration.
The application KAVAS described throughout this work,
clearly fulfills the three requirements we started with:
 R1 - Handling of complex threat intelligence
data: The CTI Vault persists STIXbased threat
intelligence information in a graph database. It
additionally provides the possibilities to store
Table 2 General information on the interview participant
Position Business Branch Organization’s size CTI Knowledge STIX Knowledge
#1 Security Researcher Academia ca. 5.000 high medium
#2 Chief Information Security Officer Manufacturing ca. 15.000 high high
#3 Security Analyst Manufacturing ca. 15.000 medium low
#4 Chief Technology Officer Secure Cloud Services ca. 60 medium medium
#5 Senior Consultant Security Consultancy ca. 20 low low
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externalized user knowledge in its knowledge base,
while the integrity of the original information is
preserved and ensured. Moreover, any data stored in
the vault is compliant with the STIX format at any
point in time.
 R2 - Visual representation of STIX: KAVAS’
visual component can display threat intelligence and
enables security experts to interactively explore
incidents and gain insight about what happened.
 R3 - Conversion of experts’ knowledge: As
described above, KAVAS provides functionalities for
each of the four knowledge conversion processes.
Fulfilling all the stated requirements, KAVAS offers a
flexible platform for sharing, analyzing, annotating and
visualizing cyber threat intelligence information based
on the STIX data format.
Future work
Although we met the previously defined requirements
for KAVAS, some challenges remain, which have to be
addressed in future work.
A key challenge for future work regarding the CTI
Vault will be the analysis of STIX data to find intercon-
nections and redundancies between different bundles,
which currently are standalone object pools, not at-
tached to each other. Enabling the interconnections be-
tween and the merging of bundles could contribute
greatly to the usage of STIX features. Additionally, this
would improve the quality of available threat intelligence
information. Examples for this are the merging of differ-
ent incidents into a whole campaign of attacks and the
determination of correlations between observed events
within different incidents. The process for merging bun-
dles and finding redundancies has to be subject for fur-
ther research as it is a challenging task to identify
interconnections and quality problems across independ-
ent bundles.
Additionally, there are some potential improvements
regarding the functionalities of the visual component.
During the interviews, the participants highlighted the
need for a number of different advanced filters as well as
some other features, which would help them even more
to work with complex threat intelligence. Furthermore,
experts should be included into the process of merging
and connecting bundles. KAVAS could also be extended
to support more sophisticated collaboration features for
security experts like annotating CTI information to ex-
change domain knowledge in a more direct manner.
Another important future challenge regarding our pro-
posed visual analytics tool is a comprehensive user study
to quantify its effects on the work of security experts.
These effects need to be quantified. Also the tool’s impact
on the quality of threat intelligence documentation has to
be measured as expert knowledge can be externalized with
KAVAS. Currently, KAVAS is only validated in terms of
being able to work with the very limited examples pro-
vided by the OASIS committee and by a qualitative evalu-
ation to show its feasibility. The main reason for this
small-scaled evaluation is the lack of available real-world
threat intelligence data being documented with STIX 2 up
to this point in time. Its predecessor STIX 1 is the
industry-wide state-of-the-art for documenting this type
of information and we presume that it is very likely for
STIX 2 to achieve the same amount of acceptance in the
near future. Since the specification of STIX 2 is still under
development, it is not reasonable to evaluate the effective-
ness and efficiency of KAVAS in a comprehensive and
quantitative manner yet.
Another topic for future work has to be the analysis
and assurance of data quality among STIX bundles. As
STIX supports collaborative efforts to maximize the
number of prevented cyberattacks, the data quality of
the incident descriptions is crucial. This is becoming
even more true when the information is analyzed and
enriched by human operators. High quality information
is essential to ensure trust. Therefore, existing data qual-
ity metrics have to be applied on STIX-based descrip-
tions to assess the added value they provide. Moreover,
visual metaphors for these metrics have to be added to
the KAVAS visual representation helping analysts to as-
sess the trustworthiness of the information.
Endnotes
1https://trac.tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7970
2http://veriscommunity.net
3https://stixproject.github.io
4https://github.com/oasis-open/cti-stix-visualization
5https://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javaee/
overview
6https://angular.io
7https://material.angular.io
8https://d3js.org
9https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/ex-
ample/defining-campaign-ta-is/
10http://bit.ly/2NLDn3W
11http://bit.ly/2xX74EO
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